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An Examination of the Status of
Probability Sampling in the Courts
Boyd Randall
Brigham Young University

Paul Frishkoff
University of Oregon
Auditing researchers, staggering under an ever-increasing blizzard of pronouncements, articles, and memoranda, might well be disposed to believe that
complexity feeds on itself. For example, two themes which were of much concern—perhaps even dominant—at the first two University of Kansas Auditing
Symposia were the increase in litigation against auditors and the growing
sophistication of statistical sampling techniques in auditing. This paper attempts
to examine the interaction between the two.
Indeed, his paper arose directly as a result of the 1974 Symposium. At that
conference, one of the present authors raised the question of whether statistical
sampling (i.e., probability sampling) would be a better defense in the courts
than judgment sampling. There appeared to be some division among practitioners present at the conference.
1

Practitioner Opinions
Some felt that the use of probability sampling would ameliorate the position
of the defense in a lawsuit, since probability sampling is viewed as more "scientific," as encompassing more up-to-date technology, and as more susceptible to
mathematical "proof" of its validity.
Others were more skeptical or at least agnostic. They felt that expert witnesses might debate the merits of a particular probability sampling plan to the
ultimate utter confusion of jurors and jurists. Their contention was that the
"expert judgment" of a highly trained professional, on the other hand, was less
suspect and less susceptible to point-by-point rebuttal.
Our purpose in this paper is twofold. First, we will examine past court
decisions to discover whether the courts have shown any preference for probability sampling. Then we will examine cases in which probability sampling was
used, either by one of the parties or by the courts themselves, to see what implicit
standards for such sampling may be emerging from the judicial process.
For readers who are curious about the outcome of these questions, yet less
than enthusiastic about wading through the details of this paper, we will admit
at the outset that our conclusions are more equivocal and more tentative than
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either they or we might have wished. Auditing remains an inappropriate field
for uncertainty-avoiders!
Some Definitions
Probability sampling plans, to quote one source implicitly used by the courts,
". . . make use of the theory of probability to combine a suitable procedure for
selecting sample items with an appropriate procedure for summarizing the test
results so the inferences may be drawn and risks calculated from the test results
by the theory of probability. For any given set of conditions there will usually be
several possible plans, all valid, but differing in speed, simplicity, and cost."
Simple random sampling is but one of many possible applications of probability
sampling.
Judgment (non-random) sampling plans, on the other hand, ". . . have one
common characteristic: the probability that an individual (item) is included in
the sample is unknown. . . . When the determination of the individuals (items)
to be included in a sample involves personal judgment, one cannot have an
objective measure of the reliability of the sample results, because the various
individuals (items) may have differing and unknown chances of being drawn."
A census involves the examination of all items in a population, rather than a
sample thereof. The economics and timing of such procedures preclude their use
for more facets of an audit.
2
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Extent of Use of Probability Sampling
The official policy of the A I C P A has been to condone both probability and
judgment sampling. A n examination that we made of a (non-random) sample
of six recent auditing textbooks indicated that judgment sampling was not
explicitly condemned, but the preponderance of material under the heading
"sampling" dealt with probability sampling.
Most accredited Schools of Business have required one or more courses in
statistical theory and techniques for at least the past decade or two. A l l national
C P A firms and the A I C P A have offered training programs or modules on
probability sampling as well. One might expect, then, that probability sampling
is used overwhelming. This is apparently not the case, however.
4

A questionnaire survey by Jacobs of C P A firms in the Los Angeles area revealed a wide disparity in the use of statistical sampling within a given office,
among firms of a given size, and among firms of differing sizes. As might have
been expected, the use of statistical sampling by national firms was far greater
than by locals, but the use was far from universal in any size grouping.
A more extensive questionnaire survey, undertaken by Strawser and Hubbard
confirmed these findings; their research also indicated that utilization of statistical
sampling techniques has been increasing fairly rapidly in recent years. These
results were consistent with an unscientific face-to-face inquiry of various Portland, Oregon practitioners undertaken by one of the present authors during the
past year.
Judgment sampling, then, is still very much alive, and its acceptability in the
courts is thus not a trivial problem.
5
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Survey of Cases
We surveyed a wide variety of cases where statistical sampling was an
explicit issue or in which it was mentioned by the courts. We wish that we
could report that we found The Definitive Audit Case or a truly helpful case of
any kind. Instead, we found that references to sampling usually arose where the
technique was being used to gather evidence for the court, rather than where it
had been used prior to the litigation, such as in an auditor's test of transactions.
Therefore, we concentrated on court pronouncements that suggested standards
that should be used in sampling. Such standards, we argued, should be applicable
in almost any context, and in particular where an auditor's use of a sampling
method might be questioned relative to the standards recognized by the courts.
Implicit Court Standards for Sampling in General
There is no codified law regarding standards for sampling. Yet standards of
other bodies, while not of themselves court standards, become so indirectly when
they are recognized and cited as such by the courts on sufficient occasions.
"Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases" is
a Report of the Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted
Litigation. This report was adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United
States in March, 1960. It reached the following conclusions on the question of
sampling:
Scientifically designed samples and polls have received increasing acceptance in recent years in government and in industry. The important
question to be considered in a given case is whether the contemplated or
proffered sample or poll is admissible under existing rules of evidence.
Samples [confined to observable facts]. When a sample is offered
through the testimony of the sampler, the report on the sample examined
(i.e., on the count of units or the test borings, in the samples noted above)
usually does not involve hearsay. In order to project this report, however,
the burden of proof rests upon the offeror to show, by the testimony of
a statistical expert, that the sample was selected in accordance with accepted principles of sampling so that it properly represents the universe.
Note. Once this is established, there remain only questions of relevancy,
materiality and weight.
7

The note in the above quote refers to two sources of accepted principles of
sampling. They are:
1. Munitions Board Standards, Agency of the Department of Defense, and
2. The American Society for Testing and Materials.
We were unable to locate the Munitions Board Standards, but we did examine
the relevant standards of The American Society for Testing and Materials
( A S T M ) in some detail.
A perusal of ASTM's standards for statistical sampling reveal—by the sophisticated nature of the language, mathematical notation, and footnote references—
that these standards were enacted by statisticians for use by those with considerable
grounding in the field of probability and statistics.
ASTM's pronouncements also reveal, time and again, a pronounced preference
8
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for probability sampling and an aversion to wholesale nonrandom sampling.
For instance:
In order to make any estimate for a lot or for a process, on the basis
of a sample, it is necessary to select the units in the sample at random.
. . . The only universally acceptable definition of a random selection is
is one made by the use of random numbers, which in effect is the
guarantee of thorough stirring of the sampling units in a lot.
Selection by use of random numbers need not be more onerous or costly
than hit-or-miss methods of sample selection, provided the sampling plan
is thoughtfully formulated. . . . Randomness is obtained by positive action;
a random selection is not merely a haphazard selection, nor one declared
to be without bias. . . . However, mechanical selection is still usually
preferable to a judgment-selection.
The foregoing paragraphs do not mean that nonrandom and judgment
samples, for example, may provide useful information for the efficient
design of a probability sampling plan. . . . It also should be noted that
judgment plays an important role in the design of a probability sampling
plan. For example, it may be used to assess costs, to estimate spreads and
likely values of variances; also definitions of strata. In the actual probability sample, however, judgment is not used in the selection of the
individual items of the sample, nor in making the inferences, nor in calculating the risks of decisions based wholly on the sample or succession
of samples.
9
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Thus, nonrandom sampling is relegated by A S T M to a role of amassing initial
evidence when little is known about the underlying population. Such might be
the case in a preliminary stage of an audit of a previously unaudited client, for
instance, but would not likely be the case in the actual selection of receivables to
be confirmed for the engagement, and especially would not be supportable for an
engagement that has been of long standing.
The courts have cited the Handbook, and thus implicitly the A S T M standards,
on at least three occasions. None involved auditing, however, and none involved
a head-on-head confrontation between probability and judgment sampling.
In Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank, the courts rejected plaintiff's
sampling plan in an action under the Sherman Act for treble damages and
injunctive relief. The court held that the restraint involved in a "no check" plan
whereby school employees were required to take some affirmative action to
transfer funds from defendant bank to a bank of the employee's choice was not
shown to be unreasonable.
12

. . . (T)he tendency is to admit the results of properly conducted
surveys for whatever they are worth in spite of the hearsay difficulty. . . .
In this case, however, we do not even reach the hearsay question as it
relates to the admissibility of surveys, for we think the trial court was well
within its bounds of discretion in refusing to admit a poll conducted as
was this one.
A survey is inadmissible when the sample is clearly not representative
of the universe it is intended to reflect. See Hawley Products C. v. United
States Trunk Co., 1 Cir., 259 F . 2d 69, 77; Handbook of Recommended
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351,429; . . . Here
the universe was either all school board and hospital employees under the
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plan, or at a minimum all school board employees under the plan. The
sample was chosen from neither of these groups but instead from those
employees who at one time banked with appellants and later switched
exclusively to Commercial Security.
13

In another case, Berman v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., the court
rejected a poll as evidence, citing the Handbook, and finding the poll to be
entirely inadequate. One reason was because the sample size was less than 1% of
a universe of 3,500 to 5,000. It is of interest that the A S T M standards include a
section replete with mathematical notation entitled "Equations for Calculating
Sample Size," with the strong implicit assumption that probability sampling is
used and that characteristics of the underlying probability distribution are known
or can be estimated.
In a third case in which the Handbook was cited by the court, Grotrian,
Helfferich, Schuz, etc. v. Steinway and Sons, the court held that the survey
offered in evidence met the criteria for admissibility of samples found in the
Handbook.
14
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Court's Examination of Underlying Probability Distribution
The underlying probability distribution on which a sampling plan was based
arose in two cases involving depreciation, both, however, concerned tax litigation, not financial auditing.
In Commissioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., the question was whether a
television network affiliation for a two-year term, which is automatically renewable in the absence of termination by the affirmative act of either of the parties,
for an unlimited number of successive two-year terms, is a depreciable asset.
The Seventh Circuit Court held that it was not a depreciable asset.
17

The theory of the statistical tables compiled was that an annual rate of
contract termination for each pertinent period could be obtained by dividing the total number of years commenced by all the affiliation contracts
during a given period into the total number of contract terminations
occurring during the same period. Using that termination rate, taxpayer's
expert witnesses testified that the average life expectancy of any given
contract could be determined by applying the Poisson-Exponential Theory
of Failure. The crux of that theory is that the percentage of failure of items
to which it is applied is a constant. . . .
Adopting that theory, and applying it with some modification to the
statistical history, the Tax Court found that an estimated useful life of the
W I S H and W A N E C B A affiliation contracts could be determined with
reasonable accuracy, and that use of a straight-line method over 20 years
was a reasonable basis for depreciation of the contracts.
We think the Tax Court erred. . . .
It is likewise clear that the stipulated exhibit graphically refutes the
existence of a basic premise upon which the Poisson Theory relies, namely,
that the life expectancy of all contracts is the same regardless of the length
of duration of the contract.
1 8
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Super Foods Services, Inc. v. United States is similar to Indiana Broadcasting. Super Foods owned franchise contracts with grocers; they attempted to
depreciate the contracts, but the IRS claimed that the contracts had indefinite
20
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lives. The plantiff introduced a study of 486 contracts; the study tended to
show that any contract which had been in force more than 12 months had an
average life of 86 months. Expert testimony was that the contracts "display a
definite and consistent pattern of termination." The government relied on
Indiana Broadcasting for the proposition that statistics of past performance do
not reliably predict termination dates. In ruling for the taxpayer, the court
distinguished Indiana Broadcasting because in the present case the IRS had
introduced no evidence of their own to controvert plaintiff's statistical evidence.
Court's Examinaion of Sampling Plan Used by Litigant
Johnson v. White was an action by Connecticut welfare recipients against
the state commissioner of welfare. The commissioner had converted the F A D C
program to a "flat grant" system to simplify A F D C payments by averaging
budgeted needs of each size of assistance unit and making identical payments to
each family of a given size. The court held that such averaging was permissible,
and explained:
21

The defendant adopted a pre-sample confidence interval of 95%,
plus or minus 10%; and a post-sample check determined that the selected
level of confidence had in fact been met. The defendant's sampling technique was approved by H E W . The plaintiff's claim that in certain
components of need for certain assistance unit sizes, the sample size was
too small to guarantee the selected level of confidence. The defendant's
confidence level, however, was for the average of budgeted needs as a
whole, rather than for each component in the standard of need. Giving
due weight to the expert opinion of H E W , the court finds that the
defendant's sampling technique was adequate.
22

Use of Sampling Techniques by Court Itself
In Rosado v. Wyman, also a welfare case, New York welfare recipients
claimed that the state impermissibly lowered the standard of need by eliminating
items arbitrarily in 1970. Social Security Act Sec. 402 (a) (23) provides that a
state may not lower its standard of need by arbitrarily eliminating items which
were included before enactment of the amended statue in 1969.
The court used statistical sampling techniques to determine if amounts paid
under the 1970 plan accounted for certain special need grants paid in 1968. The
amount of aid received by a sample of 1968 recipients was compared to the
proposed 1970 schedule. The court found that 1968 recipients received more than
was allowed by the 1970 schedule, refuting New York's allegation of paying
100% of the standard of need in both years.
23

Some Other Illustrative Cases
Many anti-trust cases employ statistics. In bank merger cases, such as United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank and United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., the government used rather simple arithmetical statistics to
show the effect of mergers. For a detailed analysis of these two cases, and—in
particular—for suggestions for the use of statistics in similar cases, see Lozowick
et a l .
24
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A n older case involving statistics, a landmark anti-trust action, was United
States v. United Shoe Machinery? The court discussed minor problems with
the government's choice of universe and of sample selection, but accepted the
sample pragmatically, because ". . . if anti-trust trials are to be kept manageable,
samples must be used, and a sample which is in general reasonable should not
be rejected in the absence of an offer of a better sample."
27
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In Hawley Products Co. v. United States Trunk Co. (a case, incidentally,
cited by the court in Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank, which we
discussed earlier) and in a related case, American Luggage Works, v. United
States Trunk Co., plaintiff attempted to prove that its design for suitcases had
acquired a secondary meaning. The survey was "inadmissible to show that in
the market of ultimate consumers the plaintiff's design had acquired a secondary
meaning when the universe surveyed consisted of retailers."
In International Milling Co. v. Robin Hood Popcorn Co.
the evidence
included a consumer action survey designed to determine whether purchasers
associated the product packaged by International Milling with the product packaged by Robin Hood. The Commission went into detail in describing the survey,
the questions asked, the selection of a sample and the standard deviation expected.
Readers may be familiar with the use of sampling in cases where a defendant
or plaintiff has asserted that a jury is racially imbalanced and thus in violation of
Fourteenth Amendment rights. In cases such as Carter v. Jury Commission,
courts have been willing to accept a statistical analysis of the population and use
that probability to determine that a certain proportion of jurors should be of a
particular race. (Such cases, of course, involve arguments from the population,
rather than from a sample.) A recent article on jury selection goes into detail
on the statistical problems involved.
29
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Sampling Standards Employed by Internal Revenue Service
The IRS issued some rather lengthy standards of sampling in conjunction with
the timing of trading stamp redemptions. These standards explicitly condone
only probability sampling. Thus, "the taxpayer may use any sampling procedures
that are in accord with generally accepted probability sampling techniques. . . .
While no specific requirements are established for the sampling expert responsible
for the design of the study, it is recognized probability sampling is a highly
specialized field and that otherwise competent statisticians may not be qualified
in the field of probability sampling. . . . The sampling plan which is used must
conform to the standards of the 'Report of Committee on Standards of Probability
Sampling for Legal Evidence—Admissibility of Data from Probability Samples.' "
3 5

This report, published by the Society of Business Advisory Professions, Inc.,
in cooperation with New York University, is remarkably similar in tone and
substance to the previously cited A S T M documents. The report does not allow
for the possibility of judgment sampling, and indeed makes the solemn assertion
(in two different places) that: "The interpretation of a statistical calculation such
as the standard error is not a matter of opinion, nor of judgment, but is a
mathematical consequence."
36
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Approval of Probability Sampling by U.S. Congress
In a bill approved in 1964, the House of Representatives specifically permitted
the use of statistical sampling procedures in the examination of vouchers. A
detailed report accompanying the bill discusses the appropriate use of statistical
sampling in the examination of vouchers and the reasons supporting increased
governmental adoption of statistical analysis.
37

A Most Tentative Conclusion
No absolutely definitive case has yet arisen to demonstrate that judgment
sampling will not be allowed by the courts in auditing. Nonetheless, some trends
seem apparent to us. The courts—and such quasi-judicial agencies as IRS—are
relying more heavily on sophisticated statistical documents whose standards barely
condone, and certainly do not encourage, nonrandom sampling when probability
sampling is feasible.
We can not conclude with the lame epithet that "further research needs to be
done." There is no more "data" left to examine, and additional "research" will be
effected by the courts themselves. Our murky crystal ball suggests that a landmark case involving sampling in an auditing context will arise within the next
few years. We caution those auditors who continue to use judgment sampling in
the presence of feasible probability sampling procedures to be prepared to defend
their logic in so doing. For that matter, given some of the decisions cited, we
urge auditors who use probability sampling to be prepared to defend their
particular sampling plans in terms of demonstrating that their sample results can
indeed be argued to be representative of the underlying universe.
Addendum: Sampling Lost, Sampling Vindicated?
The following case has been verbally cited to us by several colleagues. So far
as we know, it has not been officially reported. Moreover, it is somewhat dated
and was tried on a municipal court level only. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, we include it for the interested reader.
In Sears Roebuck and Co. vs. the City of Inglewood, Sears sued for a sales
tax refund of $27,000. Sears had found an error in their own local records as to
the extent of out-of-city sales, such sales not being subject to the municipal tax.
In support of their contention, Sears conducted a random sample of sales slips,
which indicated that the refund ought to be $28,250, plus or minus $4,200, at a
95% confidence interval.
The judge ruled against any sampling technique! This ruling was not predicated on any statistical oversight in Sears's procedures, but on the judge's contention that the amount of the refund must be determined exactly, without any
possible error in estimation, however small. That is, he insisted, as required by
the applicable statute, that Sears demonstrate a lack of sales tax liability for
each invoice!
Since the Court permitted Sears to perform a "complete audit," the plaintiff
did not appeal the case. The complete audit, of which the sample had constituted
only 4%, revealed a liability of $26,750.22, well within the confidence interval.
As we said, we doubt that this case constitutes an important precedent, since
38
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special conditions were present which the judge interpreted to preclude any
form of sampling. If sampling is applicable, judges can be expected to follow
the precedents that have been cited, and even if a judge does not understand all
of the ramifications of sampling, sampling is at least likely to be tolerated.
It is of interest, however, that the author who cites this case goes on to
comment, hypothetically, ". . . if (the judge) had refused to admit the amount
of the claim as $27,000 because it was based on a judgment sample as opposed
to the random sampling insisted on here, that also would have been a valid
objection."
39
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